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DETERMINANTS OF RESIDENTIAL WATER CONSERVATION:
THE CASE OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
Eric A. Coleman and Terry Glover

ABSTRACT

This study evaluates the effectiveness of demand-side water conservation policies in Salt
Lake City, Utah for the years 1999 to 2002. We add to the existing residential water demand
literature by exploring panel estimation techniques with disaggregated household level data.
Alternative policies used to induce water conservation are discussed based on estimates of
demand schedule parameters. We find that public conservation campaigns have had negligible
impacts on the city's water use. There have been, however, statistically significant reductions in
consumption due to price changes despite minimal price increases. Our findings should enable
local and state policymakers to better assess the tradeoffs of alternative conservation programs.

DETERMINANTS OF RESIDENTIAL WATER CONSERVATION:
THE CASE OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

I. BACKGROUND
The Utah Wasatch Front region has experienced periodic drought throughout its history,
and in every year since 1999 Utah's annual rainfall has been below its thirty-year average
(UDWR 2002). These conditions, combined with rapid population growth, have made water
allocation an important policy debate in the region (UDWR 2003). Traditionally, the state has
addressed these needs with attempts at increasing water supplies and improving infrastructure for
delivery. Federal projects such as the Weber Basin, Central Valley and Joes Valley, and local
projects subsidized by state agencies, made continued exploration possible (UDWR 2002).
Recently, the municipal government of Salt Lake City has recognized the limits of water
exploration and the impending need for increased conservation. The city started experimenting
with demand-side management policies in 1995 by commissioning a panel to assess potential
conservation from rate structure changes in its billing. In the city's 2002 Summer Water
Management Plan, there is mention of the need for a "more aggressive water rate structure," and
eventual change for pricing in the summer of 2003 (SLC DPU 2002). However, residential and
agricultural users have been particularly hostile to those changes.
Alternative (non-price) demand-side management policies have been introduced in many
areas where price increases seem politically infeasible. In particular, Salt Lake City has
implemented moral suasion programs to encourage conservation as part of the statewide public
education water conservation campaign known as "Slow the flow, Save H20" (SLC DPU 2002;
UDWR 2002). This campaign includes mailings, television and radio ads, and a webpage. The
Utah Division of Water Resources (2002) asserts that water use has decreased " .. .in every water
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district studied, a probable result of the campaign." In addition, water efficiency studies have
been conducted for municipal green spaces and the public information campaign has been
augmented with "demonstration gardens" within the city. Myriad other projects have also
emerged, including those for specific conservation targets involving large water users and
participation in the EPA Water Alliance for Voluntary Efficiency (WAVE) program (SLC DPU
2002).
Burgeoning debate in Utah around inducing residential water conservation makes this
study especially salient to policymakers at the state and municipal level. Many Utah cities have
experimented recently with changing water rate structures, and many more participate in the
"Slow the Flow" information campaign. Because issues of water shortage and rate increases
now face citizens statewide, there has been immense public interest and much media attention to
the issue. Salt Lake City is the state's largest city, as well as one of its fastest growing cities, and
is therefore especially important in the policy debate.
This debate suggests that more information is needed on the forces that induce water
conservation. The purpose of this current study is to attempt to analyze the effects of pricing
strategies relative to moral suasion campaigns on water use within the Salt Lake City area. A
water use equation is estimated to identify the separate impacts of these forces. Results from this
paper add to information available to policymakers statewide when deciding on conservation
strategies.
We independently assess the magnitude of the state public information campaign's
effectiveness on Salt Lake City's water use patterns. Alternative water conservation strategies
are then offered based on price elasticities measured from a sample of residential water users.
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The wealth of household-specific time series data provide a unique opportunity to model use
responsiveness of individual households to these various policy alternatives.
To our knowledge, this is the first water use study using panel data methods to obtain
estimates at the household level. In short, we find that increasing prices would be significantly
effective at reducing water consumption in summer months when most discretionary water use
takes place. In addition, there have been only negligible effects on the city's water use from the
statewide "Slow the Flow" public information campaign. The next section reviews the literature
in residential water demand. Section three introduces the data and section four reviews the
econometric models used to arrive at our results. Section four reports empirical findings and
section five concludes.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Howe and Linaweaver (1967) conducted one of the first aggregate studies of residential
water demand by comparing a cross-section of cities throughout the United States. Using a
simple linear regression model, they found indoor water demand to be relatively price inelastic.
The authors also concluded that consumers react to average prices instead of marginal prices,
because few consumers know how to read water meters accurately. Therefore, consumers are
unaware of their water use vis-a-vis block rate structures that induce differing marginal prices
depending on consumption level. Following this study, others in early water demand literature
also used "ex post calculated" average prices (Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989). Three problems
arose with this early approach. First, conventional micro economic theory posits agents making
decisions based on marginal rather than average prices. Second, prices are likely correlated with
the stochastic disturbance term in the single equation water demand model, and are therefore
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endogenous. Third, aggregate cross sectional data is limited in its ability to model individual
consumer behavior. Water economists subsequently tried compensating for each of these
shortcomings. Each is addressed below.

Price Definition
Borrowing from concurrent research in utility markets, where similar block-rate pricing
exists, the specification of price variables has changed. In his study of the electricity sector
Taylor (1975) argued that marginal and average price should be used together for estimates in
markets under block pricing. Nordin (1976) later modified Taylor's suggestion by requiring a
"difference" variable instead of average price. The Taylor-Nordin difference variable, or rate
premium, is defined as the difference between what consumers would pay had they been charged
their ending marginal price all along, and what they actually have to pay. The difference
variable takes into account that residential water users face intramarginal differences in price
depending on their consumption level. Because of inconsistent marginal prices under block-rate
pricing, consumer income deviates from what it would be if water were sold under constant
marginal prices (Dandy, Nguyen, and Davies 1997).
A simple example of Salt Lake City's billing structure helps to illustrate. The city's tariff
system uses a fixed allowance and a constant block rate as shown in Figure 1, where average
price is measured against water use. Up to the first WI (500 cubic feet) units of water,
consumers are charged a flat fee RI x WI. Note that a household consuming beyond the first
block at, say, W 2 is being charged marginal rate R2 for all water in excess of WI. The marginal
price facing this consumer is R 2, so that the average price per hundred cubic feet of water is
falling. In a competitive market this consumer's total expenditure for water would be the shaded
portion of the graph (area R2 x W 2).
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FIGURE 1
ILLUSTRATION OF THE TAYLOR-NORDIN DIFFERENCE VARIABLE

Due to the block-rate structure, however, the actual bill is the shaded area plus the crosshatched
area (RI - R2 x WI) in the above region. If the household had been charged the marginal price of
water for the entire bill, their bill would be lower. The crosshatched area acts as an implicit use
tax, and is therefore expected to be negatively related to water use. It represents the so-called
Taylor-Nordin difference.

Note that an increasing block rate structure implies an implicit

income subsidy (Renwick and Green 2000), and the effect of income on water consumption
should be equal in magnitude and opposite in sign of the difference variable (Nieswiadomy
1992).
The water demand literature has generally incorporated the Taylor-Nordin specification
for price variables, but some studies have tried to empirically test whether consumers react to
marginal or average prices. Nieswiadomy (1992) used a "perceived price," which is simply a
combination of average and marginal prices first developed by Shin (1985). Opaluch (1982)
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suggests using a new price variable, defined as the difference between average and marginal
prices, and develops a limited test for inference of the appropriate variable. This specification
was later used by Nauges and Thomas (2000).
Water is typically assumed to be price inelastic, at least at low quantities of consumption,
but market demand curves for most functional forms are elastic in some regions and inelastic in
others. Therefore, any statement of price elasticity of water must be qualified within a given
price range. Disparate results emerge from the plethora of water demand studies; however,
based on a meta-analysis of forty- five studies that derive price elasticity measures, Dalhuisen et
al. (2003) concluded that residential water demand is generally relatively price inelastic. Factors
influencing that finding are functional form of models, accuracy of information of block pricing,
and inclusion of alternative price specifications. Interestingly, the discrete-continuous choice
model first used by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) consistently provides inelastic price estimates.
Brookshire et al. (2002) review a number of water demand studies focused specifically on
the western U.S., and question the validity of many elasticity measures. They maintain that in
communities where cost-based marginal prices are "far" from the rates actually being charged,
elasticity estimates may not be useful to policymakers, especially since this jeopardizes the
applicability of such measures to price ranges outside of the actual prices being studied.

Model Specification
The literature has generally led to the conclusion that under block rate pricing there is
bias in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of single equation water demand models, because
of the joint determination of water use and prices (Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989; Hewitt and
Hanemann 1995; Renzetti 2002). Water users respond to the marginal price of water by
consuming a given amount. The amount they consume also determines the price of water if they
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face a block rate. The Taylor-Nordin difference variable is also determined by consumption and
must be solved simultaneously with the other two variables. As mentioned by Hewitt and
Hanemann (1995), water demand models often compensate for this endogeneity by using
instrumental variables under two- or three-stage least squares estimation techniques.
Dalhuisen et al. (2003) summarize common variables used in identifying residential
water demand. Economic variables, such as price (marginal, average, and the difference variable)
and income are commonly included, and are usually the primary focus of all research. These
measures are vital in explaining how water markets work, and nearly every study on water
demand reports one or both.
Climatic variables are also commonly included. These variables are assumed to be
exogenous and are often statistically significant. For example, seasonality affects sprinkler use
and lawn watering differences throughout the year. Soil type, evapotranspiration, rainfall, and
elevation may all contribute to changes in water use (Hansen, Hughes, and Chiang 1994).
Household variables commonly used include income, income proxies, commerciaVresidential
dummies, lot size, number of bathrooms, and household density. All of these explanatory
variables may be significant in defining water demand.
A number of studies have also used alternative demand-side management policies such as
public information campaigns and conservation programs as explanatory variables affecting
water use (Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf 1999; Nieswiadomy 1992; Renwick and
Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000). For example, Renwick and Archibald (1998) look at
the effects of the 1982-92 California droughts on 119 households in the communities of Goleta
and Santa Barbara. The cities tried several alternative demand-side management policies to
curtail water use during and after the drought. For instance, Santa Barbara restricted irrigation
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use and Goleta allocated water quotas based on historic use and imposed stringent fee increases
for quota violations. Subsidies for low-flow toilets and showerheads, retrofitting, and public
information campaigns to inform citizens on water efficient irrigation technologies were also
used in the region. The authors conclude that each policy alternative had a statistically
significant effect on reduced water demand in the area.
Two years later, Renwick and Green (2000) extended the study to eight aggregated
California water districts. Their goal was to assess the relative effectiveness of alternative
policies in reducing water demand. They found that price responsiveness varied seasonally, and
that stringent mandatory non-price policies, such as quotas, were more effective in reducing use
than voluntary measures, such as rebates, retrofitting, and public information campaigns. The
authors conclude that modest decreases in water use (5%-15%) can be achieved through price
mechanisms or voluntary measures, but that significant reduction (> 15%) is best achieved
through well-enforced rationing schemes. Table 1 gives results from studies using public
information campaigns as explanatory variables. It shows that moral suasion campaigns may be
very effective at reducing demand. However, these studies fail to analyze the long-term effects
of campaigns and the costs of implementation.
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TABLE 1
STUDIES OF PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS

Study
Michelsen, McGuckin and Stumpf (1999)

Nieswiadomy (1992)

Renwick and Green (2000)

Location
Los Angeles
San Diego
Denver
Broomfield
Albuquerque
Santa Fe
Las Cruces
North Central U.S.
Northeast U.S.
Southern U.S.
Western U.S.
8 California cities

Effect on Mean
Consumption (%) 1
-1.1 **
-2.7**
-2.0**
0.0
-2.0**
-4.0**
0.0
1.9

-4.24
17.6
-17.56*
-8.0**

*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%

Data

Danielson (1979) argues that using cross sectional data for demand analysis requires the
heroic assumption that the spatial effect of the explanatory variables equals the temporal effect.
Hanke (1970), Danielson (1979), Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), and Brookshire et al. (2002)
instead argue that data should ideally be collected from a number of households over time in
order to accurately measure consumer behavior. Unfortunately, such data are difficult to obtain.
Many studies still use aggregated cross sectional data across states, communities, or regions
because it is readily available (Gaudin, Griffin, and Sickles 2001; Howe and Linaweaver 1967;

I Effects from Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf (1999) and Renwick and Green (2002) are taken from the
respective study. To estimate the mean effect on consumption for Nieswiadomy (1992) we used Kennedy's (1981)
technique:

%Effect =

100(eX{B - V~) J-1J

fJ is the dummy variable regression coefficient for the public information campaign, and V (fJ) is the
variance of fJ .
where
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Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf 1999; Nieswiadomy 1992; Renwick and Archibald 1998;
Renwick and Green 2000).
To exploit the properties of combined cross sectional time series data (also known as
panel data), a number of estimation techniques have been developed. However, only a few water
demand studies have incorporated panel estimation. Although Gaudin et al. (2001), Renwick
and Green (2000), and Nauges and Thomas (2000) use such models for residential water
demand, they are limited by the use of aggregate data obtained at the community level. Moeltner
and Stoddard (2004) obtain panel estimates from a random effects model at the firm level for
commercial water use, but to our knowledge panel data models for residential households have
not been thoroughly explored.
Brookshire et al. (2002) argue that disaggregate household data need to be combined with
adequate fluctuations in price to accurately estimate a price elasticity measure. Communities,
however, do not dramatically change water prices over short periods of time, making price
elasticities immeasurable. Gathering household data over lengthy time periods is also costly and
time consuming.

III. DATA

A complete database of Salt Lake City households' monthly water use during the period
from February 1999 to October 2002 was obtained from the Utah Division of Water Resources.
Water use from the billing period is converted to daily averages and then transformed to thirtyday averages in order to have conformable data between cross sections. Quantity is reported in
thirty-day averages of hundred cubic feet (HCF) consumed. Marginal prices and the TaylorNordin difference variable were calculated based upon the city-mandated price structure. They
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are adjusted for inflation (CPI base year 2002) in price per hundred cubic feet of water.
Although rates slightly increased nominally from year to year over the study period (see
Table 2), real winter rates remained relatively constant, and in some years even decreased.
Yearly summer rates had slightly more price variation from year to year.
The city's billing structure is complex. The first determinant of the bill is the connection
size of the pipe for incoming water. Based upon that size, the city charges a flat fee for the first
500 cubic feet of water consumed, and a lower average fee for each 100 cubic feet of water
thereafter. Dwellings outside of city boundaries that are serviced by Salt Lake City are charged
an even higher marginal rate if consumption is beyond the fixed allowance. In this study, the
total water bill is inferred from total usage, connection size, location, and pricing determined by
city ordinance. In instances where the billing period is not thirty days the city extends the flatfee allowable amount in proportion to the lag in measuring time. For example, a user with a one
inch connection that is billed 45 days after the previous billing would be charged the "one inch
flat fee" for the fust 500 x (

:~) = 750 cubic feet of water consumed and the appropriate

marginal price for any water consumed in excess of that amount. Knowing the dates of the
readings has allowed us to reconstruct the bill for each household despite the inconsistency in
measurement with respect to time.
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TABLE 2
Dates

WATER BILLING WITHIN SALT LAKE CITY
Meter Size
Fixed Fee Season
Nominal Marginal Rate
3/4" & 1"

July 1, 1998 -

June, 30 1999

1 112"

$18.38

2"

$27.51

2 112"

$75.00

3"

$55.07

4"

$84.91

3/4" & 1"

July 1, 1999 -

June, 30 2000

$20.10

2"

$29.96

2 112"

June, 302001

$59.73

4"

$91.95

July 1,2001 -

June, 30 2002

$21.51

2"

$32.06

3"

$63.91
$98.39

July 1, 2002 -

June, 302003

$23.02

2"

$34.03

0.51

Summer

0.78

Winter

0.55

Summer

0.83

Winter

0.59

Summer

0.89

Winter

0.61

Summer

0.93

$100.00

3"

$68.38

4"

$105.28
$8.40

1 112"

$23.94

2"

$35.67

2 112"

Winter

$8.08

1 112"

3/4" & 1"

0.72

$100.00

4"

2 112"

Summer

$7.55

1 112"

3/4" & 1"

0.47

$100.00

3"

2 112"

Winter

$7.06

1 112"

3/4" & 1"

July 1, 2000 -

$6.31

$100.00

3"

$71.12

4"

$109.49

The state public information campaign started on October 31, 2001. In the regression
analysis entries before this time are assigned a 0 and after this time a 1. This does not, however,
exactly represent a true estimate of public information campaign effectiveness. The Jordan
Valley Water Conservancy District originally developed the "Slow the Flow, Save H20"
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campaign years earlier at a regional level throughout the Salt Lake Valley. The state
subsequently adopted this campaign based on its established name recognition. Still, the dummy
variable used in this study can be justified on the presumption that once adopted at the state
level, funding increased and it was better publicized. Its coefficient in the econometric models is
interpreted as the effect on average water consumption once the campaign was adopted at the
state levee.
Building area, number of bathrooms, and lot size were obtained from the county
recorder's office by matching a parcel number for the dwelling also available to the water utility.
The income variable is a proxy obtained following Nieswiadomy and Molina's (1989)
procedure, later used by Hewitt and Hanneman (1995). First, the taxable value of the dwelling
was retrieved from the county recorder's office. Using the fact that banks usually issue loans
such that a monthly mortgage payment does not exceed one-third of a borrower's income, and
assuming a ten percent interest rate, it is approximated: Income = (Taxable Value )(0.10)(3/12).
These values were then adjusted for inflation using the CPI, and trended using the average
annual growth rate of per capita income in Salt Lake City for the years 1999-2002.

The dummy variable approach to estimating the campaign is not ideal. It assumes that marketing strategy, funding,
and overall intensity of the campaign are the same in each month. Perhaps using a proxy for intensity, such as
monthly expenditure for the program, would better model changes in the campaign over time.
2
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TABLE 3
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

Variable

Name

Description

Household-average thirty day
water use

HCF of water used by consumer i at time t

City-wide average monthly
water use

Average water use for the entire city in every month, t,
measured in HCF

MP

Marginal Price

Measured in 2002 dollars per HCF of water

D

Taylor-Nordin difference
variable (rate premium)

Implicit tax on consumers in 2002 dollars

I

Income proxy

Calculated monthly income in 2002 dollars

STF

"Slow the Flow" Public
information campaign dummy

=1 if the campaign in effect (2001-2002);
=0 otherwise (1999-2000)

A verage daily precipitation

As measured (inches) from nearest weather station

Fraction of wet days

Number of wet days divided by the total number of
days in billing cycle

Average maximum daily air
temperature
Evapotranspiration

Derived from nearest weather station to the dwelling

PRECIP
WETF
TEMP
ET
AREA
BATH

Building Area

Total area, in square feet, of the dwelling

Number of Bathrooms

Total number of bathrooms for the dwelling

LOT

Lot size

Acres of the lot size of the dwelling

METER
APT

Meter size

Size, in inches, of the connection size to the dwelling

Apartment dummy

RATE

Rate dummy

FEE

Fixed fee dummy

=1 if dwelling is zoned as an apartment
=0 otherwise
= 1 if marginal rate in effect when water use was read
=0 otherwise
= 1 if fixed fee in effect when water use was read
=0 otherwise

Average daily E.T. using Blaney-Criddle specification

Three weather stations are used to compute climate variables: the Salt Lake Airport,
Hogle Zoo, and Murray Golf Course. The dispersion of the stations fortunately offers a range of
accurate climate measurements across the valley. The Salt Lake Airport is located on the west
side of the valley at a relatively lower altitude than the others. The Murray Golf Course, on the
other hand, is on the eastern side of the valley on the benches of the Wasatch Mountain Range.
Differences in elevation are then implicit in climatic measurement, especially precipitation. The
Hogle Zoo, located in the middle of downtown Salt Lake City, provides additional moderation.
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Using Geographic Information System (GIS) software, dwellings are assigned to the
nearest weather station, and daily average readings of precipitation and temperature are given to
each household. Because readings are daily, each household's climate variables perfectly match
the days during the billing cycle. Evapotranspiration is then measured using the Blaney-Criddle
(1950) method, suitable for desert-like climates similar to the Salt Lake Valley. Variable
definitions are provided in Table 3.
The database originally included approximately 3.5 million monthly observations of
consumer water use. Cross sections with missing values, incomplete panels, and non-residential
water users were eliminated from the dataset. We follow Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) and
simply eliminate those few households consuming less than 500 cubic feet ofwater3 . For
reasons described below, the sample panel is then limited to summer observations, and therefore
consists of 1047 households for a total of eighteen months. Summary statistics for this sample
are found in Table 4.

3Recent work by Dandy, Nguyen, and Davies (1997) attempts to capture the effects of pricing with fixed fees by
dividing the sample into entries consuming within the free allowance and those above. The authors then separate
observations into two models for pooled estimates. However, price variables are eliminated from the model of those
consuming less than the free allowance since all of those consumers face a zero marginal price and zero difference
variable. Estimates were relatively stable between the two models for the authors ' other explanatory variables.
Since this study focuses on the policy implications of pricing instruments, and to avoid panel data complications
from singling out observations for households, we do not estimate parameters of the model for those few households
consuming within the free allowance.
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES DURING SUMMER MONTHS

Variable
Water use
Marginal Price
Taylor-Nordin Difference
Income Proxy
Slow the Flow
Precipitation
Fraction of wet days
Ave. Maximum. Temperature
Evapotranspiration
Building Area
Bathrooms
Lot Size
Meter Size
Apartment

Mean
Std. Dev.
42.54
30.66
0.85
0.15
4.05
l.41
3200.45
1502.35
0.33
0.47
0.026
0.02
0.15
0.08
85.7
6.35
l.04
5.58
2073.28
827.23
2.1
0.91
0.18
0.1
0.14
0.76
0.04
0.002

IV. MODEL SELECTION

Agthe et al. (1986) were the fIrst to use a system of linear equations representing water
supply and demand "derived from an indirect utility approach to investigate the behavior of
consumers facing a nonlinear budget set." The authors constructed supply functions to
compensate for the endogeneity of marginal price and the difference variable. These equations
included variables that shift or otherwise change the rate structure. We follow this approach, but
adapt the model to household specifIc data. This reduces the supply equations to sets of
instrumental variables as explained below. First, arranging the data by stacking all time
observations for each household we form the following equations from the even panel of sample
data4 :

4 The average price specification was not used after preliminary statistics revealed that in Salt Lake City average
price would be negatively correlated with water use a priori. As shown in Figure 1 increased water use implies
smaller average price merely because of the rate structure.
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[1]
[2]
lnDit =

Jr

DZD
it

+CiD +eitD

i =1, ... ,N

(N

= 1047)

t

[3]

= 1,... ,T

(T = 44)

The unobservable household specific disturbance for each equation is represented by c i

,

discussed in more detail below. The idiosyncratic disturbance term for each equation ise it , and
is transformed to correct for a first-order autoregressive disturbance process, AR(I). The
predicted marginal price

(M~t

) and difference (Dit) variables for household i in time period t,

are obtained by the reduced form supply equations [2] and [3]. The explanatory variables in
these two equations consist of a series of dummy or shift variables taken from changes in the rate
structure and monthly averages of municipality-wide water consumption. During the forty-four
month period, the marginal pricing structure was changed a total of nine times, and
therefore

zt:

p

contains eight dummy variables indicating when a particular rate structure was in

effect. The flat allowance fee during the sample period changed five times; thus, since the
difference variable is affected by both flat fee changes and marginal pricing, Zi~ contains a total
of twelve dummy variables. In addition, city-wide average monthly water consumption is
included in both equations to represent the quantity of water available, on average, to each
consumer given the current rate structure. Assuming that a single household's ability to change
average water consumption for the entire city is negligible, all right hand side variables in [2]
and [3] are exogenous to the system. Therefore, the supply equations simply reduce to a set of
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instruments for the marginal price and difference variable. In addition, the exogenous
variables Xit in the water use equation [1] are a matrix of climate, policy, and household
variables. In short:

. =

X/I

,lnAREAj ,lnLOT; ,APT; ,lnBATHj

,PRECI~t ,WETFu ,lnTEM~t

'J

lnET;t ,lnMETERj

Zi~P

Zi~

(Inlit,ST~

= (Rate2, Rate3, Rate4, Rate5, Rate6, Rate7, Rate8, Rate9, w t )

= (Rate2, Rate3, Rate4, Rate5, Rate6, Rate7, Rate8, Rate9, wt ' F ee2, F ee3, F ee4, F ee5)

Refer again to Table 4 for variable definitions. The structural parameters for this model

Pooled Ordinary Least Squares

We use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) as a starting point because of its convenience

in estimation. However, using pooled OLS on equation [1] requires some very restrictive
assumptions. We must assume that household specific effects do not exist, and that each
observation can be treated as strictly independent of all others. First, we assume the existence
ofu it

= ci + eit , a composite error term, where u is iid. Assuming zero covariance between

eit , this allows us to write equation [1] as:

[4]

Ci

and
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Individual household effects, c i ,may be subsumed in the idiosyncratic error term u i; ,
implying zero correlation between the variables on the right hand side of equation [1] and the
household specific effects (Wooldridge, 2002):

[5]

Similarly, OLS assumes that marginal price and the difference variable, along with all other
explanatory variables, are strictly exogenous:

[6]

Finally, we impose a constant variance restriction on the error term:

[7]

Now we defme matrix A = ( In MP

In D

X) and parameter vector Ii = (a

fJ '1),

where MP, D, and X are vector representations of

lnM~t' lnD it , and

estimates from the pooled data given bY&oLs = (A'

At) A'(ln w) will be unbiased and efficient

X it , respectively. OLS

under the prior assumptions.

Pooled OLS with Instrumental Variables
We now consider that under block rate pricing the marginal price, M~t , and the TaylorNordin difference variable, Dj(' may be endogenous. We thus relax the assumption [6] that all
variables in A are strictly exogenous. Following Greene (2003, pg. 78) an instrumental variable
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(IV) technique is used. We write the projection of In MP on the exogenous variables from [2]
as:

/\

InMP

= Z MP(Z MP'Z MP) -l Z MP'(InMP)

[8]

and the projection of In D on the exogenous variables from [3] as:

[9]

We next define matrixB = (lnMP

lnAD

X) and write the pooled IV estimates

Fixed Effects

Pooled estimates of the data do not account for heterogeneity across households, which
may be important in explaining consumer water use behavior. To account for these household
specific effects, we now relax assumption [5], and acknowledge that some variables for all
equations may be correlated with c j

•

The dummy variable c j is simply used to distinguish

households, and represents unobservable household characteristics 5 . However, with a large cross
section of households (in our case 1047) the dummy variable approach to defining this
heterogeneity quickly becomes impractical. Standard fixed effects models (also called "within"
estimates) "remove" this household effect by transforming the panel data through first
differencing or deviating individual observations from household means. Since c j is time

5 Such characteristics in our model may include a household's relative degree of exposure to the public information
campaign, sense of community, desire to conserve water, desire for a healthy lawn, etc.
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invariant, either method eliminates it and all other time invariant variables from the water use
equation. Estimates after this transformation are consistent after relaxing assumption [5]. We
follow the latter approach and in so doing redefine [1]-[3] as:

(In wit -In Wi )= (lnM~t -lnM~}x + (lnDit -lnDi)p + (Xit - X it }
- Z~P
LMP + (,elf~P (lnMPIt -lnMP)= (Z~p
It
If
F
I

f!P)
e
l

+ (e i; - eiw )

[10]
[11]
[12]

where

In Wi , lnM~ , etc. represent the respective mean values for each individual i, with respect

to time. To simplify notation, we define a new set of equations:

[13]
~

~MP

lnMPit = Zit

1r

MP

~MP

[14]

+ eit

[15]

where In Wit =

(In Wit -In Wi)'

InM~t

=

(lnM~t -lnM~), etc., or deviations from household

means.
Similar to the instrumental variable procedure defined earlier, we define projections from
lnD and lnMP for the fixed effects model:

[16]
[17]
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Now define matrix F = ( In NIP
estimators &FE = (F' F

In

D X) and solve for the fixed effects

t F' (m w). These results are unbiased and consistent under the
1

assumption that at least some of the variables in F are correlated with the household effects
(W ooldridge 2002).

Random Effects (Generalized Least Squares)
Random effects estimates have the benefit of providing estimates for all explanatory
variables, including those dropped in the fixed effects model. However, it again requires the
restrictive assumption that household heterogeneity is not expressed in the household specific
dummy variable. The procedure involves using generalized least squares (GLS) on the data
sample, with a variance-covariance matrix defined below. First, we re-impose restriction [5] that
individual specific effects are uncorrelated with right hand side variables, where c j is again
subsumed in the error termu jt • Following Wooldridge (2002, pg. 259), we relax assumption [7],
but retain assumptions [5] and [6], and adopt:

[18]
[19]
[20]

where the within-group disturbances,

(J'2
/]

n = E(ujU j ,) =

+ (J'2c

n, are defined as:

2
(J'c

(J'2
c

(J'2
c

2
2
(J'/]+(J'c

(J'2
c

(J'2
c

(J'2
c

(J'2
/]

[21]

+ (J'2
C
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and for the entire sample, the complete covariance matrix is:

g

V=

0

0
g

0

0

0
0

=IN ®g

[22]

g

where I N is an N x N identity matrix.
Generalized least squares (GLS) regression requires adjusting equation [4] using the
variance structure presented in [21] and [22]. This is done by pre-multiplying both sides of the
equation byg-1I 2. Thus, when transforming all three equations we have:

g - 1I2

In w =

g -1I2

InMPa + g-1 / 2 InDP + g- 1I 2Xy + g-1I 2u w

[23]
[24]
[25]

or, by Hausman and Taylor (1981):

(In Wit

-

(1- B)In W i

)= (InM~t - (1- B)InM~}x + (InDit - (1- B)InDi)P +

[26]

(Xi; - (1- B)Xi; } + (e i; - (1- B)et )
[27]
[28]

where:
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Again for simplicity, we define these equations as:

In w= alnMP+ j3lnD+ X Wy +e

w

[29]
[30]
[31]

where

w= (In Wit

-

(1- B)ln Wi)' MP = (lnMP;t - (1- B)lnMp;), etc.

In order to make the transformation () must be solved, implying that both (j~ and
(j~ must be estimated. Consistent estimates of (j~ are taken from the fixed effects model

previously estimated (Wooldridge 2002). To obtain a consistent estimate of (j~ consider the
"between effects" model:

[32]
[33]
[34]

When using between effects strictly time variant variables (i.e. do not vary between cross
sections) are dropped from the estimation. The "Slow the Flow" campaign dummy variable,

STF, and the instrumental variable average city-wide water use, wt , are dropped because of their

time dependent nature. We define G = (In

the between model are obtained by

M~

i

In

~ ~i
i

),

&BE = (G'G tl G'(ln Wi).

so that regression coefficients for

From this (j~E is obtained. Using
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the relationship,

()~ = ()~E ~ ()~
-

T

,

all the requisite infonnation to generate

e is now present

(Hausman and Taylor 1981). This transfonnation implies that random effects estimators are
merely a weighted average of between and fixed effects (Hausman and Taylor 1981).
After obtaining an estimate for

e and transfonning the data, random effects estimates are

calculated. Again using the first stage proj ections, we define a matrix R = (In

The random effects estimates become,

&RE

=

~p

DX).

InA

1

(R'Rt R'(In w). Although we gain the estimated

coefficients on time invariant variables, random effects will only be consistent if assumption [5]
holds.

V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Initially, estimates were generated from the previous four models for the entire sample of
water users over the whole time period. It was found from these estimates that the marginal
price and difference variable were indeed endogenous in water use equation [1]6. Surprisingly,
marginal price coefficients for the models were positive. After further investigation of the rate

6 The theoretical linkage between marginal prices and the difference variable has already been discussed. To
empirically test the assumption of endogeneity, a Hausman (1978) specification test was performed on the fixed
effects model. The test statistic has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equivalent to the number of
explanatory variables (in this case eight). It is defmed as

where, &is the difference between estimates using the instrumental variables and those without them, so that:
FE
~ FE
The terms, V IV'
FE V FE
.
.
.
fr
hid
.
.
hni que.
us:. = u~ IV
- u OLS .
OLS are vanance-covanance matrIces om t e re ate estimation tec
The null hypothesis is that regression parameters are equivalent under the two models. Under the null hypothesis
OLS estimates are considered consistent and efficient, but inconsistent under the alternative. IV estimates are
consistent under both the null and the alternative, but inefficient under the null (Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989).

m

For our data, the resulting statistic is
= 193.1 which greatly exceeds the chi-square critical value of 20.09 at the
one percent significance level. We thus conclude that the marginal price and difference variables are endogenous,
and proceed with the two-stage estimation technique.
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structure, this result is explained by the invariance of real marginal pricing in winter months, and
steep increases in pricing during the summer. Average summer marginal rates, after adjusting
for inflation, were $0.85 per RCF of water. During the winter the average rate was $0.58 per
RCF, and that rate stayed relatively constant across years. Coinciding with rate increases was a
dramatic change in water use, from an average of 14.3 RCF of water per household per month in
the winter, to 42.54 RCF during the summer. Thus, positive marginal prices were hypothesized
to be due to collinearity associated with a summer dummy variable.
To test if intercept or slope coefficients changed during summer months, we used a
dummy variable indicating summer months and an interaction variable between the summer
dummy and marginal prices, following Kmenta (1997, pg.469). We found that there was a
statistically significant positive change in intercept during summer months, and a statistically
significant negative change in marginal price slope. This follows intuition, as the positive
increase in intercept reflects a general outward shift in water use during months when there is
greater water use. The negative slope change reflects increased elasticity of water demand in
summer months when water use is more discretionary in Salt Lake City. If we assume, as
Danielson (1979), that winter demand represents strictly "in-house" demand, then almost twothirds of summer water use is for outdoor purposes. Since outdoor use is arguably more
discretionary than indoor use, we would expect summer months' price elasticity to be greater (in
absolute terms) than winter.
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wt

TABLE 5
PANEL ESTIMATIONS OF INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 7
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
lnMP
lnD
lnD
lnMP
-0.01
0.003
-0.009
0.003

Rate2
Rate3
Rate4
Rate5
Rate6

(136.43)**
0.302
(477.05)**
-0.089
(-134.37)**
0.322
(563.31)**
-0.041
(-60.84)**
0.368
(659.56)**

Rate7
Rate8

0.41
(756.57)**

Fee2
Fee3
Fee5

Constant
R-Squared
Number of
Observations

-0.582
(-717.33)**
0.99
17799

(-71.58)**

0.19
(64.15)**
0.099
(39.41)**
0.219
(47.23)**
0.176
(55.11)**
0.334
(72.82)**
0.251
(58.24)**
0.095
(32.58)**
0.069
(33.50)**
-0.091
(-35.23)**
1.287
(179.90)**
0.80
17799

(141.30)**
0.304
(527.61)**
-0.089
(-141.58)**
0.324
(596.47)**
-0.041
(-64.30)**
0.369
(697.70)**

0.411
(799.61)**

-0.58
(-213.01)**
0.79
18846

(-70.62)**

0.171
(58.27)**
-0.101
(-32.79)**
0.025
(4.51)**
-0.197
(-40.71)**
-0.032
(-5.06)**
-0.293
(-41.70)**
-0.249
(53.90)**
-0.103
(-40.81)**
0.081
(25.66)**
2.013
(176.80)**
0.39
18846

t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

Using the motivation that prices do not vary in winter months, we limit the dataset to
include just those summer months for which average city-wide water use was above 25 ReF (i.e.
the months of June, July, August, and September). First stage estimates of the instrumental
variable coefficients for the fixed effects and random effects models are provided in Table 5, and
estimates for water use are provided in Table 6. Estimation results indicate good model

7 When eliminating winter months the flISt and last marginal rate structures, Rate1 and Rate9, were not in effect for
any summer month in the sample, nor was fixed Feel.
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TABLE 6
PANEL ESTIMATIONS OF WATER USE
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
lnw
lnw
lnMP
-0.407
-0.366
(-16.90)**
(-9.45)**
lnD
-1.191
-0.732
(-11.69)**
(-13.10)**
lnI
0.411
0.426
(14.40)**
(9.57)**
STF
-0.007
-0.053
(-0.95)
(-7.21)**
lnET
0.357
0.319
(6.71)**
(9.12)**
PRECIP
-1.37
-1.241
(-11.28)**
(-10.17)**
lnTEMP
0.233
1.255
(3.22)**
(25.42)**
WETF
-0.099
-0.191
(-3.24)**
(-6.36)**
APT
-0.19
(-0.72)
lnEATH
0.126
(3.33)**
lnAREA
-0.054
(-0.98)
lnLOT
0.49
(13.81)**
lnMETER
0.264
(3.38)**
Constant
-0.112
-3.638
(-4.59)**
(-8.84)**
R-Squared
0.78
0.46
Number of
Observations
17799
18846
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

perfonnance. Variable coefficients are relatively stable across random and fixed effects models
indicating robust estimates.
The first stage regressions produce high goodness of fit measures, essential in order to
achieve good instruments (Renwick and Green 2000). The R-Squared value for the fixed and
random effects water use models are 0.78 and 0.46, respectively, and are well within the range of
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previous studies. In both water use models all variables have the expected signs and are
statistically significant. A Hausman (1978) specification test provides strong evidence for using
the estimates of the fixed effects model 8 . Intuitively, the key consideration in deciding whether a
random or fixed effects model is most appropriate depends on whether the explanatory variables
are uncorrelated with individual effects (Wooldridge 2002). Our conclusion implies that
unobservable effects due to fixed household specific heterogeneity are an important element in
measuring water use.
Evapotranspiration, the approximate rate at which water evaporates, is positively
associated with water use. This presumably reflects the high proportion of outdoor water use in
summer months. Consistent estimates from the fixed effects model indicate that a 10 percent
increase in the rate of evapotranspiration would result in consumers using 3.6 percent more
water. Average maximum daily air temperature elasticity is statistically significant at 0.23,
which also intuitively reflects the discretionary use of outdoor water. The elasticity of
precipitation, calculated at the mean, is -0.04. This implies that if monthly precipitation
increases by 10 percent, average household water use would decrease by 0.4 percent. The
fraction of wet days during a month also mildly affects consumption. Unfortunately, since

8

This requires another Hausman specification test of a slightly different form:

where ()

= ()"FE
IV

-

"RE

() IV

,and

VIVFE ,VIVRE are the fixed effects and random effects covariance matrices. Fixed effects

estimates are consistent when household effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, but random effects are
not. A statistically significant difference between the two estimates is considered evidence against the random
effects model (Wooldridge 2002). The chi-squared test statistic with eight degrees of freedom is 5987.21 which
exceeds the critical value of 20.09 at a one percent significance level.
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random effects estimates are inconsistent, coefficients for variables representing time invariant
household characteristics remain ambiguous 9 .

v. CONCLUSION
From the preceding estimations we find that marginal price and the Taylor-Nordin
difference variable are endogenous to the water use equation. Because unobservable household
effects are correlated with the exogenous variables, fixed effects estimates using an IV procedure
to correct for price endogeneity generates the appropriate estimators for this model.
A number of important findings can be gleaned from these results. First, the hypothesis
that the influence of the difference variable is equal in magnitude and opposite in sign of the
income effect is rejected at a one percent level of significance 10. Other studies have had similar
findings in this respect. Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) explain the deviation from theory may
be due to the surrogate nature of the income variable, the fact that the difference is such a small
fraction of income, or because of consumers' lack of information on complicated rate structures.
Our estimation techniques provide unique insight to evaluate the effects of public
information campaigns and other public policies on Salt Lake City households' water use
patterns. The elasticity of marginal price is approximately -0.4 for both models, which is within
the range of measurement from previous studies (Dalhuisen et al. 2003), especially when
compared to previous research on water demand in the western United States (Brookshire et al.
2002).

9 Nauges and Thomas (2000) outline gains in efficiency and the potential to recover estimates of the time invariant
variables for the fixed effects model by using instrumental variable techniques (see Hausman and Taylor, 1981 and
Amemiya and MaCurdy, 1986). Despite this, variables exogenous to Ci, needed for that estimation, were not
available. Climate variables largely depend on house location and are therefore specific to the household.

10 For the fixed effects model, the test statistic for the null hypothesis that 61
99 percent confidence interval assuming a normal z distribution.

+ f3 = 0 is

10.76, and is rejected on a
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Elasticity measures are limited by the assumed log-linear functional form of our model,
and must be interpreted with caution. The assumption that price elasticity is constant in any
price range is probably unrealistic (Gaudin, Griffin, and Sickles 2001). This makes predictions
outside of prices within the dataset unreliable (Brookshire et al. 2002). Nevertheless, the
estimates obtained may provide significant insight into the relative effectiveness of public
policies on households' behavior over the time being studied. However, econometric estimates of
winter marginal price elasticity cannot be generated because there is virtually no price variation
within our dataset during those months.
The public information campaign dummy coefficient is insignificant in the more
appropriate fixed effects model. Despite Nieswiadomy's (1992) finding that public information
campaigns are extremely potent in the West, this does not appear to be the case in Salt Lake City.
In comparison with other areas (see Table 1), the "Slow the Flow" campaign has had negligible

impact on water consumption. Costs of implementing the information campaign are beyond the
scope of this paper, but any positive cost would indicate a failure of cost-benefit criterion given
the zero effect evident in the econometric analysis of this study.
One caution in interpreting the effect of the public information campaign needs to be
noted, however. The measure of the influence of the campaign on water use is simply whether
the campaign is in existence (the dummy variable thereby taking on a value of 1) or not (the
dummy variable thereby being 0). We were unable to obtain data that would indicate the
intensity of the campaign, particularly as the campaign was implemented in the Salt Lake City
area. It is still an open question as to whether the intensity of the implementation of such
campaigns affects conservation behavior. We also only measure the existence of the campaign
for certain time periods within the Salt Lake area. The effect of such campaigns may be quite
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different when implemented in other areas. Certainly more study of the effects of these types of
strategies on water conservation is needed.
The dominant results of this study, however, do indicate that price changes have been
more effective at achieving water conservation than the public information campaign. Mean
household consumption in Salt Lake City during summers before the campaign was 43.75 RCF
of water per month and 40.12 RCF afterward, for a decrease in average consumption of 8.3
percent. The average marginal price of water for summers before the campaign was $0.83, and
after the campaign was $0.89, or an increase of6.74 percent. Based on a marginal price elasticity
of -0.4, mean consumption decreased by 2.7 percent as a result of the increases in rate pricing.
The negative coefficient of the difference variable implies that fixed fee changes have had an
even more pronounced effect on water consumption.
Recently, Salt Lake City implemented a more aggressive rate structure to take advantage
of potential conservation from consumer reaction to price change. In June 2003 the city changed
the existing billing structure in three ways: (1) it extended summer pricing to the months of
April, May, and October; (2) eliminated the 500 cubic foot allowance; and (3) instituted an
increasing block rate (3 blocks) system of marginal pricing (SLC DPU 2004). Real marginal
prices within the blocks are significantly higher than in previous years. This policy change
seems especially promising because historical rates, even in summer months, have not increased
substantially. These changes will likely result in more residential conservation than simple
reliance on the statewide public information campaign.
In 2001, the Utah Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water Resources,

formally published a conservation goal of reducing municipal and industrial water use
throughout the state by twenty-five percent before 2050 (UDWR 2003). To achieve that goal,
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reductions were to be realized through public information and the instillation of more water
efficient technologies (UDWR 2003). This study suggests that in Salt Lake City, the state's
largest city, changes in price can be effective at achieving conservation, and may provide
incentives for the adoption of more efficient technology in water distribution and use.
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